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Mobile and wearable devices, such as smartwatches and fitness
trackers, increasingly enable the continuous collection of physiologi-
cal and behavioral data that permit inferences about users’ physical
and mental health. Growing consumer adoption of these technolo-
gies has reduced the cost of generating clinically meaningful data.
This can help reduce medical research costs and aid large-scale stud-
ies. However, the collection, processing, and storage of data comes
with significant ethical, security, and data governance considera-
tions. A complex ecosystem is developing, with the need for collabo-
ration among researchers, healthcare providers, and a broad range
of entities across public and private sectors, some of which are not
traditionally associated with health care. This has raised important
questions in the literature regarding the role of the individual as a
patient, customer, research participant, researcher, and user when
consenting to data processing in this ecosystem.1 Here, we use the
emerging concept of “digital phenotyping”2 to highlight key lessons
for data governance that draw on parallels with the history of geno-
mics research, while highlighting areas in which digital phenotyping
will require novel governance frameworks.
UBIQUITOUS PERSONAL HEALTH DATA
Phenotypic traits are broadly defined as the observable characteris-
tics of an individual that arise from the combined effects of their ge-
notype and the environment. Analysis of phenotypes yields
important insights across many fields of research, including human
evolution and cultural history, the identification of the genetic basis
of disease and health-related traits, drug repurposing, and pharma-
cogenomics. Building on developments made through the collection
and analysis of extended phenotypic data through the growth and
evolution of digital products,3 digital phenotyping can be defined as
the “moment-by-moment quantification of the individual-level hu-
man phenotype using data from personal digital devices.”2,4 This
process is often passive and allows for the quantification of the
individual-level behavioral phenotype through personal digital devi-
ces such as mobile phones and wearable technologies.4 Advances in
these data collection tools have accelerated across both academia
and industry, along with diverse applications in clinical and public
health settings. While passive data generated and collected through
mobile or wearable devices are not without limitations, for instance,
with regard to causality or the ability to match its outcomes to that
of clinical outcomes or diagnoses, its use can overcome some of the
issues associated with traditional survey-based methods. For in-
stance, the ability to obtain in situ data offers significant opportuni-
ties to mitigate the well-documented issues of self-reporting
inaccuracies,5 inconsistent classification and recording of pheno-
typic data,6 and behavior modification in some contexts due to par-
ticipation in an observed environment.7 Further, these tools enable,
at an unprecedented scale, long-term phenotyping in free-living con-
ditions with the potential for reduced subject attrition.8
Early examples of digital phenotyping studies include large-scale
involuntary hand tremor analysis via mouse cursor movement9 and
the use of Microsoft Bing search queries to detect neurodegenerative
conditions.10 Despite improvements in the collection and classifica-
tion of data, digital phenotyping poses its own unique risks for
users. Given the multidisciplinary nature of the field and the differ-
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ent levels of sensitivity of the data being collected, digital phenotyp-
ing interacts with a broad range of laws and governance regimes,
ranging from medical and research ethics to contract law and data
protection regulation. The international adoption of consumer devi-
ces allowing digital phenotyping research adds additional complex-
ity in determining the applicable regulatory framework for data
collection, sharing, and analysis. Although there are established pro-
cesses in medical research for international data sharing, the longitu-
dinal and dynamic nature of digital phenotyping can itself create
ongoing obligations across different jurisdictions and spheres of reg-
ulation. As such, there is a risk that consumers will be insufficiently
protected if they are exposed to digital phenotyping technologies
that do not fall neatly within any existing consumer protection re-
gime with an effective enforcement framework.
As devices enabling digital phenotyping research are often con-
sumer electronics, in scenarios outside of institutional research
frameworks an important dichotomy arises between consumers’ mo-
tivation to use these technologies and technology providers’ incen-
tives to collect, analyze, share, or monetize data produced by
users.11 Advances in consumer electronics sensors and trends in
wellness technologies has brought health and lifestyle data that
might traditionally have been governed by medical research ethics
and regulations outside of these institutional settings. Data that per-
mit inferences about users’ health or lifestyle through digital pheno-
typing are now increasingly available for collection by commercial
hardware and software vendors, which are not typically healthcare
providers. A broad range of harms related to the collection of health
data online has been highlighted in the academic and policy litera-
ture, including unethical data collection12 and provision of inaccu-
rate clinically relevant data.13 As digital phenotyping becomes more
prevalent and is used by commercial providers of other services, or
to generate diagnoses, there is also the potential for discriminatory
use of sensitive data, such as exclusionary insurance, employment
discrimination, or unfair credit scoring.14,15 While a number of
existing data protection, consumer protection, and antidiscrimina-
tion laws may help safeguard the use of personal health data in vari-
ous contexts, the efficacy of these laws have not been fully tested in
the array of novel contexts in which health data may be used. Simi-
larly, a lack of regulatory clarity and oversight may also fail to pro-
vide commercial providers and researchers with the certainty
required for ethical scientific research and innovation and shift the
burden of screening digital health technologies onto patients and
clinicians.16 Further, digital phenotyping must move toward the de-
velopment of standards that identify sources of bias and enforce the
development of models that are robust to skews and incompleteness
associated to this type of data.17,18
Digital phenotyping at scale
While genotyping has become more widely accessible during the
past 20 years due to falling costs of sequencing and consumer-
focused providers, many of the benefits of digital phenotyping arise
from technologies developed first for mass consumer adoption.
From a regulatory perspective, one difficulty posed by digital pheno-
typing is the use of data collected outside of a traditional healthcare
context to make health- and wellness-related inferences. This
expands the circumstances in which health data are collected, and
also importantly allows for health-related analysis of types of data
that may previously have been considered less sensitive. While aca-
demic research using consumer technologies remains subject to
existing frameworks on ethical research, the increasing functionality
of consumer electronics means that digital phenotyping can also be
conducted in a commercial context. There is already some scope for
supervision by consumer protection agencies with relatively broad
remit, such as data protection authorities, in Europe under the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and to an extent the Fede-
ral Trade Commission (FTC) in the United States, for deceptive or
unfair practices regarding data governance.19 Omnibus data protec-
tion regulation such as the GDPR provides a baseline level of protec-
tions for data processed outside of a healthcare setting. This is
essential for securing data rights in circumstances in which con-
sumer devices are actively designed or can be repurposed to engage
in digital phenotyping. However, frameworks such as the U.S.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) place
greater emphasis on the context of processing and the parties in-
volved,20,21 with consumers relying either on more general state law
such as the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) or the FTC as
a backstop to pursue data governance rights outside of a HIPAA
context. As U.S. policymakers react to the growth of digital pheno-
typing and there are state and federal attempts to introduce broader
regulatory frameworks akin to the CCPA, there will be opportuni-
ties to learn from the EU experience with the GDPR. Where digital
phenotyping allows health-related insights to be drawn from an in-
creasingly diverse range of data, greater regulatory clarity on the
categorization and treatment of digital phenotyping data in different
contexts, for example, on the scope of EU GDPR definition of per-
sonal data concerning health, would allow agencies such as data
protection authorities to better allocate scarce resources. While the
FTC in the United States has continued to emphasize its supervision
of health-related data, even when not covered by HIPAA,22 there
remains no general concept of sensitive data in U.S. general law to
provide ex ante guidance to consumers of their rights.23 For U.S.
policymakers, this creates the opportunity to improve on the GDPR
in this respect and provide greater clarity around the use of data for
digital phenotyping. While governing digital phenotyping at scale
may require new models of resource allocation and oversight, initial
steps could focus on developing enforceable industry standards,
such as approved GDPR codes of conduct, to act as certifications of
specific data governance standards for consumers. Given the impor-
tance of international collaboration in medical research, it will be es-
sential for policymakers across jurisdictions to consider the
obstacles reported by medical researchers in complying with sub-
stantially different local data regulations.24
Although reforms to existing regulatory frameworks are re-
quired, there also remains underenforcement of regulations which
are already in force. Even where digital phenotyping is covered by
data protection regulations that apply outside of institutional re-
search studies, given the potential scale of the field due to wide-
spread adoption of consumer electronics, regulators lack the
resources required to provide comprehensive oversight.19 A 2019
study found that numerous mobile health apps still regularly failed
to disclose processing of special category health data under the
GDPR, instead providing only the more basic protections required
for less sensitive data.25 Even among prominent apps more prone to
regulatory scrutiny, the complexity of terms and applicable regula-
tions can prevent consumers from understanding the nature of their
data being processed. For example, the Fitbit Privacy Policy treats
the activity and fitness data that it directly collects as if they were
nonhealth data, while noting that for any health data obtained from
other sources, or other special category data under the GDPR, Fitbit
will notify users and request separate explicit consent to process that
data.26 However, the same Privacy Policy separately informs users
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of the possibility that a broad range of collected data, including ex-
ercise, activity, sleep, biometric, geolocation, and personally identi-
fying information, may be collected. The result is that data subjects
may be unclear when accepting the Privacy Policy what forms of
data Fitbit classifies as “health data” at that time and must trust
that Fitbit will seek additional explicit consent to process this type
of data. While participants in certain forms of institutional research
or employer-sponsored programs may benefit from Fitbit, or equiva-
lent hardware providers’ research conduct guidelines or HIPAA-
compliant offerings, these are unavailable to consumers using the
same device outside of the settings contemplated by institutional re-
search or HIPAA. While legislation such as the CCPA provides more
explicit guidance on which forms of data are subject to certain rights
and goes beyond the FTC’s narrower remit, the CCPA itself has no
dedicated enforcement agency that can issue engage with issues of
interpretation or conduct investigations. It has been argued that this
sector-specific approach without a designated regulatory contact
point created obstacles to rapid U.S. public–private sector collabora-
tion in responding to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in
2020.27
Moreover, despite initially being developed as a consumer de-
vice, Fitbit and similar wearable devices are increasingly used to gen-
erate health-related insights in both research and consumer settings.
However, there are few agreed standards and minimal regulatory
oversight over the necessary reliability of outputs for research and
clinical purposes. Although classification as a “medical device”
introduces requirements regarding the validity of results, longitudi-
nal reporting, notification to users of serious health concerns, and
improved reporting, only some device manufacturers have elected to
seek classification as a medical device (eg, Apple Watch’s electrocar-
diogram app obtained de novo Food and Drug Administration clear-
ance in the United States, and is classified as a class II medical
device), and often only for some device functions.28 The methodol-
ogy for classification as a medical device differs across jurisdictions,
and the distinction between a medical device and a “wellness
device” can depend on the manufacturer’s intended uses for the de-
vice.29 Particularly for software products, manufacturers can en-
counter difficulties navigating complex regulation, and products
that require classification as a medical device may still be available
for public access without appropriate oversight.30 As a result, con-
sumers may be under the impression that a product has been subject
to a greater degree of regulatory scrutiny with regard to the quality
of its data measurement and analysis than is necessarily the case.
The Fitbit Research Pledge is an example of a consumer device
provider explicitly applying aspects of institutional research frame-
works to the use of their device, but it is not yet clear that new bind-
ing obligations are imposed or that this applies outside of formal
studies and published research. Although the FTC has broad juris-
diction over similar forms of representations to consumers,19 the Re-
search Pledge appears to apply only in institutional research settings
where those rights would already be provided as part of the institu-
tional review board process. Particularly when outside of an institu-
tional research setting, digital phenotyping is vulnerable to many of
the common problems in mobile health. Companies collecting sensi-
tive health data regularly make unilateral changes to their terms of
service, and privacy disclosures are frequently inadequate, under-
scoring a lack of protection for personal data and user privacy.31
Undisclosed sharing of digital phenotyping data, including linkable
identifiers, is prevalent.25 Inconsistent regulatory oversight, unclear
terms and conditions, and failure to disclose data sharing and sec-
ondary use can limit the ability for healthcare professionals to rec-
ommend otherwise beneficial apps in fields such as mental health
care.25 In the research context, the GDPR adopts lower protections
for data subjects in which the purpose of processing is solely for sta-
tistical or scientific research purposes. Despite submissions from
some concerned groups, such as the BioMolecular Resources Re-
search Infrastructure–European Research Infrastructure Consortium
regarding the need to define “scientific research” to exclude some
forms of commercial processing,32 the GDPR was passed to also al-
low commercial providers to use this research exemption to process
sensitive personal data without consent (though still subject to EU
Member State law, technical safeguards, and research ethical stand-
ards). Clear policy guidance on data sharing practices in these
instances is critical to maintaining public trust in scientific digital
phenotyping research and enabling the use of these methods for clin-
ical care.
THE RISKS OF DIGITAL PHENOTYPING:
LESSONS FROM GENETICS
When considering improvements to the framework for digital phe-
notyping, there are also valuable precedents from an earlier wave of
health technology innovation. Advances in genotyping techniques,
particularly from the 1990s onward, created an extraordinary op-
portunity to better understand human health. At the same time, the
sharing of the sensitive individual-level health data required for sci-
entific advances created the need to develop new standards, policies,
and regulations for genetics and bioinformatics research. This
allowed policymakers in some jurisdictions to enact measures such
as obligatory genetic counseling, requirements for validity of results,
informed consent, and chain of custody procedures,33 which built
on iterative resources such as the Bermuda Principles,34 Oviedo
Convention,35 genetic testing protocols,36 and Council for Interna-
tional Organizations of Medical Sciences guidelines.37
To advance human health and infectious disease research, cross-
border data sharing has become essential in genomics, leading to the
creation of a variety of genomic data resources. These databases are
mainly constructed by and for publicly funded scientific and medical
researchers and their institutions. They range from being completely
open, like the BRCA exchange, ClinVar, and Genome Aggregation
database,38–40 to having regulated access like the European
Genome-Phenome Archive, the dbGaP (database of Genotypes and
Phenotypes), and the Human Gene Mutation database.41–43 Poten-
tially instructive models to draw on for digital phenotyping data in-
clude controlled- or managed-access models, data access
committees, data safe havens, dynamic and tiered consent, differen-
tial access, explicit open-access consent, and portable legal consent.
In particular, dynamic and tiered consent models are readily applica-
ble to areas of digital phenotyping, in which the sensors for data col-
lection tend to be associated with a consumer device, such as a
mobile phone, which could more easily support a user-friendly inter-
face for dynamic consent models.44 Through collaboration across
researchers, commercial providers, and regulators, it may be possi-
ble to leverage these technology platforms to further improve the de-
livery and application of data management solutions developed in
genomics.
A series of studies have demonstrated the challenges for research-
ers of fully anonymizing data (including in controlled-access data-
bases such as the dbGaP), observing data subjects’ bounded consent
on collected data, and delivering clinically valid and meaningful
data in a direct-to-consumer setting.45 While the lessons learned
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from genomics in these areas can assist with approaching digital
phenotyping data governance, we must also be mindful of the im-
portant differences between genotypic and phenotypic data. While
genotypic data solely comprise genetic code, digital phenotyping
data are extremely diverse. As a result, the data collected under the
umbrella of digital phenotyping may give rise to a broader range of
possible harms.
Though there are a number of differences between genotyping
and digital phenotyping data (see Figure 1), the disparity is espe-
cially apparent in the manner of collection. The negligible costs of
most types of digital phenotyping data collection after initial invest-
ments in infrastructure means that it is efficient to aggregate large
datasets from different users who may be unaware of their inclusion
in a dataset where personal devices upload data by default to a cen-
tralized data controller. Even in cases in which explicit agreement is
sought in terms of service for data collection, the terms may not re-
flect the nature of consent for research or secondary use, and com-
plex terms and conditions can result in user fatigue and a “tick-box”
approach, meaning that users are less likely to provide truly in-
formed consent.31 Moreover, the vast majority of digital phenotyp-
ing data arise from commercial products, in which the role of these
data and the associated research is at least in part to support a busi-
ness model. Most of these data are therefore not used to produce
pure public goods or knowledge and are not freely available under
existing governance frameworks for proprietary data.
The current fragmented approach to regulatory oversight, classi-
fication of data for the purpose of identifying the applicable laws,
and varying data governance practices lowers user trust in digital
phenotyping and limits potential medical research. While the prece-
dents of considered regulation and multistakeholder collaboration
in genomics should inform developments in this field, it is also im-
portant to improve on these models where possible, and address
aspects of digital phenotyping that require novel solutions.
While genetics databases have generally tended toward releasing
aggregate data, the unique collection and delivery platforms of digi-
tal phenotyping may offer new models for data management and in-
formed research participation (see Table 1). For instance, these
technologies include the means to reduce the current practice of cen-
tralized data consolidation for the purposes of extracting value.
Through privacy-preserving, decentralized methods like federated
learning46–48 and zero-knowledge proofs, users could maintain sole
custody of their data. These methods also enable model sharing,49
as opposed to data sharing, which could allow for more seamless co-
operation between corporations and academic or public sector insti-
tutions. Advances in general techniques that are applicable beyond
digital phenotyping such as differential privacy techniques could
also address this issue by collecting and aggregating information
about groups of users’ habits and behaviors while not sharing data
from individual users. Similarly, from a consumer-facing perspec-
tive, digital phenotyping technologies could enable innovation in dy-
namic consent and through modern user interfaces and devices.
These techniques remain the subject of ongoing academic research
and improvement in their application to digital phenotyping. For ex-
ample, differential privacy techniques have been found to be difficult
to apply in practice by some healthcare researchers50 and dynamic
consent models can lead to underproduction of data for secondary
studies.51 These trade-offs demonstrate the complex challenges
posed by the field and indicate that regulatory frameworks ought to
clearly prescribe the forms of digital phenotyping data to which they
apply, while remaining principles-based and technology neutral in
their requirements for data governance.
The COVID-19 pandemic has further complicated the ethics and
governance of the collection and use of digital phenotyping data.52
For example, in some jurisdictions, anyone who carries a smartphone
can now be considered a potential transmitter of COVID whose loca-
tion and contacts with other smartphone users can be traced. This
rapid expansion of the types of data that can be considered “health-
related” may become entrenched after the pandemic, as forms of be-
havior that were previously seen as unrelated to health, such as an
individual’s movement through physical space and their contact with
Figure 1. Differences between genotyping data and digital phenotyping data. Digital phenotyping can never be said to be complete, because new data are gener-
ated continuously to reflect changing patterns of user behavior. Although sophisticated data analysis often requires considerable infrastructure and expertise,
the cost of processing and analyzing each additional data point is usually negligible.
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others, are increasingly considered to be relevant for analysis of pub-
lic health crises such as infectious disease spread.
Given the nature of the data collected, laying the foundations for
responsible data governance and providing reliable, well-validated,
and contextualized outputs will be critical to building trust and en-
abling the development of the digital phenotyping field. Mobile and
wearable technologies have the potential to transform healthcare53
by providing low-cost, objective measurements of physical, cogni-
tive, emotional, and social behaviors at unprecedented scale.54
Nonetheless, several limitations must be overcome if this potential is
to be realized, particularly as the development and deployment of
digital phenotyping technologies for mobile health has vastly out-
paced that of the methodology to evaluate its validity and safeguard
users’ rights. Several complex issues must first be resolved, such as
around who owns, controls, and can use personal health data to de-
rive wider insights; the formats and standards that should underpin
how these data are shared; and how the range of potential uses of
personal data are explained and justified to data subjects.
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